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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT-HISTORY
AND INTERPRETATION OF THE HEALTH CARE
AMENDMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
On July 26, 1974, the President signed Public Law 93-360,
enacting the health care amendments to the National Labor
Relations Act (hereinafter called the Act). These amendments,
which extend the coverage of the Labor Management Relations
Act to employees of nonprofit health care facilities, reveal a
growing concern in the legislature for the labor relations prob-
lems which have plagued the health care industry.
Prior to the enactment of the health care amendments,'
state laws regulated the health care industry. As a result,
multi-state employers were faced with substantial inconsisten-
cies in the law, making compliance a difficult and expensive
task. On the other hand, the protection afforded the three mil-
lion industry employees 2 throughout the country varied, de-
pending on the state in which they were employed. Further-
more, organizational activity caused serious disruptions of
health care services, while the wages earned by nonprofit hospi-
tal workers were substantially lower than those earned by other
employees in the health care field.3
Congress recognized the need for legislative action to pro-
vide a stable and consistent national labor policy for the health
care industry.4 Throughout deliberations on the amendments,
Congress emphasized this need for strong and comprehensive
federal action. Since the enactment of the amendments the
courts have also emphasized their stabilizing purpose by strong
statements to the National Labor Relations Board that it must
enforce the new federal policy even if it must do so by disre-
garding and, where necessary, overruling state laws. 5 This arti-
cle describes the legislative changes made by the health care
1. The effective date of the new legislation amending the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 150 et seq. was August 25, 1974.
2. FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT
(FISCAL YEAR 1975), ch. IV, at 25.
3. See 120 CONG. REC. 12937 (1974). See also Feheley, Amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act: Health Care Institutions, 36 OHIO ST. L.J. 235 (1975).
4. See, e.g., 120 CONG. REC. 12934 (1974) (remarks of Senator Cranston); see also
120 CONG. REc. 16899 (1974) (remarks of Senator Thompson).
5. See Memorial Hosp. v. NLRB, - F.2d - 93 LRRM 2571 (3rd Cir. 1976).
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amendments and analyzes how the NLRB has applied them to
date, especially in light of the duty imposed by the amend-
ments on the NLRB to assert itself in this new and unchartered
area of labor law.
I. POLICY OF THE AMENDMENTS
The amendments have a dual purpose which must be kept
constantly in mind for a clear understanding of how the NLRB
has applied the new legislation. One of the purposes was to
extend the coverage of the Act to employees in the nonprofit
health care industry. The other purpose was to prevent undue
disruptions of health care services, especially vital life saving
services.
In a public sector labor dispute the public interest, not
relative economic strength of the parties to the dispute, is often
the controlling factor. The health care amendments represent
the first time that the public interest is a determinative factor
in the resolution of a private-sector labor dispute. Up to now a
private-sector dispute was resolved solely by the relative eco-
nomic strength of the parties. But in some instances the
amendments restrict both management and labor groups from
engaging in activity otherwise permissible in private-sector dis-
putes in order to protect the public's right to receive necessary
medical services. Thus far in its handling of disputes in the
health care industry, the NLRB has tended to tip the balance
in favor of preserving health care services, often at the expense
of denying employees the full benefits of the Act.
III. DEFINITION OF HEALTH CARE INSTITUTIONS
The most basic change in the Act made by the health care
amendments is simply to repeal the exemption for nonprofit
hospitals found in section 2(2) of the Act. 7 Now the benefits and
burdens imposed by the Act are extended to employers in the
6. For the legislative history, see 120 CONG. REC. 12943 (1974); 120 CONG. REC.
16900 (1974).
7. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970) amended reads:
The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer,
directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United States or any wholly
owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or
political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act,
as amended from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when




nonprofit health care field and employees working within these
institutions.'
The amendments also added a comprehensive definition of
"health care institution" to section 2. That section now states:
The term "health care institution" shall include any hospital,
health maintenance organization, health clinic, nursing
home, extended care facility, or other institution devoted to
the care of sick, infirm, or aged persons.
The legislative history makes clear that government oper-
ated health care institutions are still exempt from the Act.9 The
NLRB has complied with this legislative mandate and has not
extended its jurisdiction over health facilities run by political
subdivisions. However, the NLRB has made an important dis-
tinction between actual administrative control and mere finan-
cial support of health care institutions. The NLRB has exerted
jurisdiction over institutions funded by governmental sources
even though such funding was virtually the facility's sole
means of financial support.10 Only when the political subdivi-
sion exerts actual control over the administration and physical
operation of the facility has jurisdiction been denied."
A second change made by the legislation provides for cover-
age of the Act for all religiously affiliated health care institu-
tions. This extension of coverage resulted when an amendment
proposed by Senator Ervin which would have specifically ex-
empted such religious institutions from coverage was de-
feated.12
Aside from the conclusions which can be drawn from the
legislative history, Congress provided very little guidance re-
garding which institutions are covered by the Act. The legisla-
tors indicated that health-related facilities such as health spas,
diet clinics and body building centers are not covered under the
8. Prior to the amendments § 2(2), the Act specifically excluded "any corporation
or association operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual ....
9. S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974); 120 CONG. REc. 6397 (1974);
120 CONG. Rac. 12935 (1974).
10. See, e.g., Morristown-Hamblen Hosp. Ass'n, 226 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 93 LRRM
1166 (Sept. 22, 1976); Mental Health Center, 222 N.L.R.B. No. 146, 91 LRRM 1326
(Feb. 13, 1976); Malcolm X Center, 222 N.L.R.B. No. 147, 91 LRRM 1352 (Feb. 19,
1976).
11. See, e.g., the Board's discussion in Rouse Home, 225 N.L.R.B. No. 125, 93
LRRM 1013 (Sept. 22, 1976).
12. 120 CONG. REC. 12946 (1976). The amendment was offered by Senator Ervin.
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new amendments, ,3 but they clearly intended to cover specialty
care centers such as private homes for the mentally retarded."
But the examples given by the legislators hardly cover the wide
variety of facilities which actually exist. In the face of this lack
of direction from Congress, the NLRB has established a stan-
dard based upon the entire legislative history of the amend-
ments. The test developed by the NLRB is based on whether
the facility provides direct patient care or whether it merely
provides indirect health maintenance. In applying this stan-
dard, the Board has applied the amendments to a rehabilita-
tion center for retarded persons'5 and a center for the care of
children with behavioral problems." However, in San Diego
Blood Bank" the NLRB refused to apply the amendments to a
blood bank set up to supply area hospitals with fresh blood.
Apparently, the NLRB requires an institution covered by the
Act to provide direct patient care within its facilities, including
actual treatment of the medical ailment, either mental or phys-
ical. By developing this standard, the NLRB can now more
readily deal with the large variety of facilities, each with its
own character and function.
IV. JURISDICTIONAL STANDARDS
During the Senate's consideration of the amendments, the
jurisdictional standards which must be met before federal law
can be applied to any health care institution provided fertile
ground for debate. Senator Taft, for example, called for the
maintenance of, or even an increase, in the preamendment
monetary standards used to determine when a health care in-
stitution was involved in interstate commerce.' 8 Opposing this
view, Senator Williams called for a substantial decrease in the
jurisdictional amount.'9
13. GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM 74-49, at 3 (August 20, 1974).
14. 120 CONG. REC 16900 (1974); 120 CONG. REC. 12935 (1974).
15. See Chicago School & Workshop, 225 N.L.R.B. No. 172, 93 LRRM 1052 (Sept.
8, 1976); Mental Health Services, 220 N.L.R.B. No. 18, 90 LRRM 1394 (Sept. 3, 1975).
16. St. Aloysius Home, 224 N.L.R.B. No. 70, 92 LRRM 1355 (June 21, 1976);
Trailback, Inc., 221 N.L.R.B. No. 107, 91 LRRM 1037 (Nov. 19, 1975) (drug related
problems).
17. 219 N.L.R.B. 116 (1975); see also Dane County Chapter, 224 N.L.R.B. No. 30,
92 LRRM 1234 (June 2, 1976).
18. See GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM, supra note 13, 304, citing Senator Taft's
remarks during Senate debate.
19. 120 CONG. REC. 12104 (1974).
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Prior to the amendments the jurisdictional amount was set
at $250,000 of gross annual income for hospitals"0 and $100,000
of gross annual income for nursing homes.2 In an attempt to
attain stability in the area of labor relations, the NLRB has
refused to take either side of the dispute found in the Commit-
tee Reports and has retained the prior standards. 2 Because the
Act has expanded the pre-amendment definition of health care
institution, the NLRB has also established a $250,000 standard
for specialty clinics and hospitals.23 This standard is consistent
with the intent of the Act. The facilities which would have been
most adversely affected by lowering the jurisdictional amount
are small medical clinics with less than ten employees. The
decrease would have entailed constitutional questions concern-
ing the authority of the federal government to interfere with
local industry and would have subjected small facilities to a
great potential for disruptions of health care services. To en-
courage this disruptive result by lowering the monetary stan-
dards would have directly contravened the stabilizing policy of
the amendments.
V. NOTICE
The most substantial changes in the Act effected by the
health care amendments are the notice requirements of section
8. This section requires a labor organization to give an em-
ployer written notice of its intention to picket, strike or other-
wise refuse to work. These notice requirements are a direct
extension of the legislative intent to prevent undue disruption
of health care services during a labor dispute. During the notice
period the employer has a chance to prepare for disruptions,
including work stoppages, and the labor organization is prohib-
ited from acting.
Section 8(g) of the Act 4 requires a labor organization to give
20. See Butte Medical Properties, 168 N.L.R.B. 266 (1967).
21. See University Nursing Home, Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 263 (1967).
22. See East Oakland Community Health Alliance, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 1270 (1975).
23. Id.
24. Sec. 8(g) of the Act reads:
A labor organization before engaging in any strike, picketing, or other con-
certed refusal to work at any health care institution shall, not less than ten days
prior to such action, notify the institution in writing and the Federal Mediation
and Conciliation Service of that intention, except that in the case of bargaining
for an initial agreement following certification or recognition the notice required
by this subsection shall not be given until the expiration of the period specified
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the employer and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service (FMCS) ten-day written notice25 of its intentions before
engaging in "any strike, picketing, or other concerted refusal
to work." The Senate and House reports, however, suggest that
more than mere compliance with section 8(g) is necessary to
constitute proper notice:
[I]t would be unreasonable, in the Committee's judgment,
if a strike or picketing commenced more than 72 hours after
the time specified in the notice. In addition, since the purpose
of the notice is to give health care institutions advance notice
of the actual commencement of a strike or picketing, if a
labor organization does not strike at the time specified in the
notice, at least 12 hours notice should be given of the actual
time for commencement of the action."
Stated more simply, a labor organization is required to give a
ten-day notice to both the employer and the FMCS of any
strike or picketing activity in which it plans to engage. If at the
end of that period the activity does not take place, the labor
organization is given an additional seventy-two hours in which
to commence the action. Furthermore, if the activity is to begin
within the seventy-two hour grace period, a second twelve hour
notice of the exact time of the commencement must be given.
If the union completely fails to act within the grace period, it
must give a new ten-day notice, before further activity is legal.
This notice procedure gives a clear indication of the Congres-
sional intent to balance the interests of all parties involved in
the dispute.
Congress intended that a violation of the section 8(g) notice
requirements is an "unfair labor practice" in itself, allowing
in clause (B) of the last sentence of section 8(d) of this Act. The notice shall
state the date and time that such action will commence. The notice, once given,
may be extended by the written agreement of both parties.
25. In order to fully comply with § 8(g), the General Counsel outlined the proce-
dural requirements as follows:
(a) the 8(g) notice should be served on someone who has been designated to
receive the notice or through whom the institution will actually be notified; (b)
the notice should be personally delivered or sent by mail or by telegram; (c) the
ten-day period begins upon receipt of the notice by the employer and FMCS;
(d) the notice should specify the dates and times of both strike and picket
conduct, if both are contemplated; and (e) the notice should also indicate which
unit(s) will be involved in the planned action.
GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM, supra note 13, at 5-6.
26. S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974); H. REP. No. 93-1051, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974).
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the NLRB to grant appropriate relief to a complainant.2 As a
result, the NLRB has found a breach of the notice requirements
without more to constitute an unfair labor practice.
Congress also made clear that injunctive relief under sec-
tion 10(j) of the Act is appropriate to restrain a union from
failing to give proper notice. 2 However, it is not clear whether
a mere threat to strike or picket without compliance with the
section 8(g) notice requirement also calls for a 10(j) restraining
order until the question of the existence of a violation has been
heard and determined by the NLRB. 21 There is strong support
for the issuance of the restraining order in this circumstance,
but the issue has not yet been resolved by the NLRB. However,
a convincing argument can also be made that injunctive relief
is inappropriate. Section 10(j) requires that a complaint must
be filed before a restraining order can be issued. Therefore, a
mere threat of a strike should not call for injunctive relief be-
cause at that point no complaint would have been made. The
question should be resolved by balancing the fundamental poli-
cies of the amendments, i.e., whether the threat of economic
activity that would, if carried into action, be a violation of
section 8(g) would cause a sufficient disruption of health care
in the facility t justify denying the labor organization its right
to engage in otherwise legitimate action. This writer believes
when economic activity is merely threatened section 10() relief
would not be appropriate, first because there has been no viola-
tion of the express requirements of section 8(g) and second,
because such a broad restriction of the power of the union is
unnecessary. When any economic activity is merely threat-
ened, no real injury to the public has yet resulted. Requiring
the union to give notice before it even threatens action and
before any injury to the public has occurred gives management
a clear advantage at the expense of the union. In addition,
permitting threats without notice does not put the employer at
a disadvantage because injunctive relief is available as soon as
the threat materializes without the requisite notice.
In drafting the amendments, Congress considered the possi-
bility that violation of section 8(g) might also entail violations
of other sections of the Act. For example, some Congressmen
27. Id.; see also 120 CONG. REc. 12935 (1974).




voiced strong support for the idea that a section 8(g) notice
violation should also constitute a refusal to bargain, an unfair
practice under section 8(b)(3).1" In addition, the legislative his-
tory reveals that when a labor organization sends notice to a
health care institution who is a secondary employer not in-
volved in the primary dispute, that notice will constitute a
"threat" in violation of section 8(b)(4) of the Act." Further-
more, a section 8(g) notice to picket will be viewed as a "threat
to picket" under section 8(b)(7).
The House and Senate Reports raise the question of
whether service of repeated notices upon a health care institu-
tion without any ensuing activity constitutes a section 8(b)(3)
refusal to bargain. The Guidelines established by the General
Counsel's Office indicates that such activity does violate the
Act.32 However, it must be emphasized that repeated notices of
activity is only evidence supporting a section 8(b)(3) charge.
Standing alone, it will not constitute a violation. The General
Counsel's position is based on the need to maintain health care
throughout a dispute. However, this reasoning is fallacious be-
cause repeated notices would not cause a disruption greater
than the actual strike or picketing which would be lawful after
the notice period ends. The rights of employees cannot be to-
tally disregarded by the desire to prevent disruption of the
facility without destroying the vitality of the amendments.
A similar problem is posed by intermittent economic activ-
ity, i.e., repeated notices with repeated strike or picket activ-
ity. The General Counsel Guidelines state that such activity
would evidence a refusal to bargain to be considered with other
factors in determining a violation.33 However, recent decisions
by the Supreme Court indicate that the General Counsel's pos-
ition may not be consistent with the objectives of the Act.3 1
According to the Court, the fact that the challenged activity is
legitimate when viewed by itself at the very least diminishes
its significance as a factor in the NLRB's determination.
30. 120 CONG. REC. 12935 (1974); see also 120 CONG. REC. 22574 (1974) for opposing
views of Senator Williams.
31. 120 CONG. REC. 12935 (1974); S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974);
H. REP. No. 93-1051, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974).
32. GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM, supra note 13, at 6, 8.
33. Id. at 12.
34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960); Lodge
76, International Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n, 96 S. Ct. 2548 (1976).
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The two most important questions faced by the NLRB con-
cerning the section 8(g) notice provisions deal with the circum-
stances in which notice is required. The question of when notice
is required was considered in the Committee Reports. These
Reports have had a determinative effect on how the NLRB has
construed the broad language of the Act. These Reports indi-
cate that any strike or picketing activity requires ten-day no-
tice, even though the activity does not relate to bargaining. 5
The legislators emphasized this point by referring to examples
of when the notice would be required. The examples included
recognition strikes, area standard strikes, secondary strikes,
jurisdictional strikes and stranger picketing.36 Accordingly, the
General Counsel Guidelines require section 8(g) notice for all
strike and picketing activity.37
The NLRB has not been entirely consistent in its approach
to when section 8(g) notice is required. In the early case of
Plumbers Local 630,11 a labor organization picketed a non-
union subcontractor who was doing renovation work for a hos-
pital on the hospital premises. The NLRB relied heavily on a
strict reading of section 8(g) and the Committee Reports to
find that proper notice should have been given. The NLRB re-
jected the union's argument that the picketing had caused no
disruption in health care services: "[A]ny strike or picketing
at the premises of a health care institution, even primary re-
served gate picketing directed at a subcontractor, is proscribed
in the absence of proper notices. ' 39 However, in a strong dis-
sent, Members Fanning and Jenkins took a broader view of the
statutory language and the legislative intent. In proving a sec-
tion 8(g) violation the dissent would require an affirmative
showing of disruption in the health care facility caused by the
union activity. If the union could show that it had successfully
separated its activity from the operation of the hospital, no
requirement of a section 8(g) notice would exist. 0
In the subsequent case of First Health Care Corp.,4 the
35. 120 CONG. REC. 16899-900 (1974).
36. 120 CONG. REC. 12935 (1974); see also 120 CONG. REc. 12939 (1974) for comments
by Senator Javits. For the Board's reflection of this argument, see First Healthcare
Corp., 222 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 91 LRRM 1097 (Jan. 14, 1976).
37. GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM, supra note 13, at 12.
38. 219 N.L.R.B. 846 (1975).
39. Id. at 840.
40. Id. at 841.
41. 222 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 91 LRRM 1097 (Jan. 14, 1976).
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NLRB faced a sympathy strike situation. The union represent-
ing the hospital's employees had given the requisite ten-day
notice and was picketing the hospital. At this time, leaders of
a second union which represented no employees at the hospital
joined in the picketing for a period of several hours. The second
union gave no section 8(g) notice to either the hospital or the
FMCS before engaging in the picketing. The administrative
law judge held that there had been no violation of the Act
because the sympathy strike was a mere extension of the origi-
nal picketing for which proper notice had been given and that
no added economic pressures had been brought to bear on the
operation of the facility by the sympathy picket. 2 The NLRB
reversed and found a violation of section 8(g) under a very
literal interpretation of its terms. Although recognizing that a
conflict between the policies of employee protection and public
interest may in some cases occur, the NLRB ruled that there
is a presumption of disruption to the health care facility when
any strike or picketing takes place on hospital premises. The
dissenting opinion, joined in by Chairman Murphy and Mem-
ber Fanning, contended that the majority opinion defeated the
spirit of the Act by applying a rigid interpretation to section
8(g).13 According to the dissent, where no evidence of disruption
to health care services caused by the secondary employer's ac-
tivity is shown, a finding of an unfair labor practice should not
be made.
The dissenting opinions of these cases have presented the
more reasonable interpretation of section 8(g). By applying a
strict construction of section 8(g) to situations where third-
party unions become tangentially involved in disputes concern-
ing a health care institution, the NLRB has defeated the fun-
damental purpose of the amendments. A rigid analysis of sec-
tion 8(g) destroys the balance between employee protection
and maintenance of patient care which is necessary for an equi-
table resolution of disputes in the health care industry. In its
concern for maintaining health care, the Board has defeated
the rights of the employees to engage in economic activities
which in fact pose no threat to health services at all. By tipping
the balance so greatly in favor of maintaining patient care, the
NLRB has actually created a shelter for employers in deroga-
42. Id., at.., 91 LRRM at 1097.
43. Id. at , 91 LRRM at 1098-99.
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tion of the interests of the other parties involved.
The legislative history of the amendments reveals that
there are two situations when section 8(g) notice is excused. A
labor organization may engage in strike or picketing activity
without first giving the advance ten-day notice or may begin
the activity after notice was given but before the ten days has
run, first, when the disruption is intended to protest a serious
unfair labor practice by the employer. This exemption con-
forms with both the decision of the Supreme Court in Mastro
Plastics Corp. v. NLRB44 and the legislative history" of the
amendments. Accordingly, the General Counsel's Office has
recognized this exemption and has not issued a section 8(g)
charge when a union was picketing in protest of the employer's
"serious" and "flagrant" unfair labor practices. 6 However, the
General Counsel Memorandum states that "[s]ec. 8(g) notice
requirements must be complied with before a strike or picket-
ing to protest 'lesser' unfair labor practices. . .. "I The dis-
tinction between a "serious" and "lesser" unfair labor practice
is obviously one of fact to be determined on a case-by-case
basis.
The second instance when the requirements of section 8(g)
are excused is when a labor organization which has already
given notice has breached the ten-day waiting period because
during that time the employer engaged in activities that would
"undermine the bargaining relationship that would otherwise
exist."" This exemption insures that the bargaining parties are
left in the same economic position after notice is given as they
were in before the ten-day waiting period began.
Just as the employees cannot breach the notice require-
ment, neither can the employer take an unfair advantage of it.
For example, the Committee Reports show that the employer
may not stockpile supplies in contemplation of a long strike,
and may not bring in large numbers of new personnel49 without
releasing the labor organization from their section 8(g) obliga-
44. 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
45. 120 CoNG. REC. 12935-36 (1974); 120 CONG REc. 16900 (1974).
46. N.L.R.B. GENERAL COUNSEL'S MONTHLY REPORT ON HEALTH CARE INSTITUTION
CASES § III, at 6 (Jan. 24, 1975).
47. GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM, supra note 13, at 14.
48. 120 CONG. REC. 12935 (1974).
49. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1974); H. REP. No. 93-
1051, 93d Cong. 2d Sess. 6 (1974).
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tion and permitting them to strike or picket immediately.
While the employer may lawfully act to maintain health care
services, especially the critical life sustaining services, during
strike activity, he may not try to establish an economic advan-
tage over the labor organization during the notice period which
would alter the parties' relative bargaining positions.
One obvious difficulty that the labor organization faces in
deciding whether the employer has "undermined the bargain-
ing relationship," is a lack of access to proof. If the union's
suspicions are unfounded, it risks an unfair labor practice
charge for violating section 8(g). On the other hand, if it waits
the full ten days, the union may jeopardize its most effective
bargaining position. However, this dilemma, though unfortun-
ate, is justified in order to protect the facility's patients. Under
the circumstances, it is certainly not too great a price to pay.5 "
Absent any notice violations by either side and after the
strike or picketing has begun, both the employer and labor
group may engage in any tactics which do not violate the Act.
At this point the employer can hire replacements and engage
in other activities necessary in order to preserve his business.
The ally doctrine may operate to enlarge the scope of the dis-
pute.5' Under the struck work aspect52 of the ally doctrine, a
secondary employer who agrees to accept work from the pri-
mary employer which he would not have done but for the strike
enmeshes himself in the dispute and loses his status as a neu-
tral party. Once his neutral status is lost, the labor organiza-
tion may direct its economic activity at this secondary em-
ployer as well, whether the secondary employer is another
health care institution or not. However, the legislative history
of the amendments reveals that a secondary employer may
perform certain services for the primary employer without be-
coming his ally. When a secondary employer provides either
equipment or personnel necessary to maintain the life sustain-
ing services of the primary employer or accepts critically ill
patients from the primary institution, it does not lose its neu-
50. The employer does have a general duty to provide information which is neces-
sary and relevant to enable the union to intelligently perform its representative func-
tions. But under these circumstances such a procedure often works too slowly to resolve
the immediate problems. See NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
51. See C. Momis, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw ch. 23(E), at 635 (1971).
52. Id. at 636.
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tral status. 53 In addition, patients are also free to leave the
primary facility of their own will and seek care at another insti-
tution. But, Senator Williams made it clear that where another
employer accepts routine patient care from the primary em-
ployer, he provides support for the primary employer's bargain-
ing position and acts at his own peril. 4
Section 8(g) applies only to labor organizations. Presum-
ably, individual employees need not comply with the notice
requirements before engaging in a strike or picketing activity.
This interpretation is supported by the General Counsel Mem-
orandum. However, that memorandum also points out that
individual activity is not protected by the Act and may subject
the employee to discharge.5 5 The memorandum implies that
employers are not obligated to give the labor organization a
section 8(g) notice before exerting their economic force. Thus,
the employer can lock out his employees without violating sec-
tion 8(g),56 although, of course, he is not thereby excused from
complying with other relevant sections of the Act. 7
VI. AMENDMENTS TO SECTION 8(d) NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
Section 8(d) establishes the mutual obligation of employers
and representatives of the employees to bargain collectively
and sets up the procedural framework defining the obligations
of each party. The first addition to section 8(d) enforces the
notice provisions of section 8(g) by providing that any em-
ployee "who engages in any strike within the appropriate pe-
riod specified in subsection (g) of this section shall lose his
status as an employee of the employer engaged in the particu-
lar labor dispute." An early interpretation of this section in-
volved hospital employees who breached the section 8(g) notice
provisions by engaging in informational picketing before the
ten days had run .5 The employer discharged four of the union
members involved in the picketing. The General Counsel found
that the employees had not violated section 8(g) because the
53. 120 CONG. REC. 12935 (1974).
54. 120 CONG. REC. 22575 (1974).
55. GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM, supra note 13, at 17.
56. For an indication on how the legislature dealt with this issue see Hearings on
S. 794 and S. 2292 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 436 (1973).
57. See, e.g., § 8(d)(A) and § 213(c) of the Act.
58. N.L.R.B. GENERAL COUNSEL'S MONTHLY REPORT ON HEALTH CARE INSTITUTION
CASES § III, at 6 (Jan. 24, 1975).
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picketing activity was in protest over certain flagrant unfair
labor practices committed by the employer. The opinion nar-
rowly interpreted section 8(d) to require that employee status
is sacrificed only when the employee engages in a strike in
violation of section 8(g). 9 Therefore, mere picketing as oc-
curred in this case does not justify discharge under section 8(d).
This interpretation explicitly reversed an earlier position taken
by the General Counsel's Office concerning the language of
section 8(d).0
The other amendments to section 8(d)' relate to the proce-
dural requirements for resolving collective bargaining contract
disputes. Section 8(d)(A) alters the notice requirements con-
tained in section 8(d)(1), (3) and (4) when a health care institu-
tion is a party to the dispute. The Act now requires written
notice to the other party ninety days prior to the proposed
termination or modification of an existing contract. In con-
trast, section 8(d)(1) requires only a sixty-day notice when a
health care institution is not involved. When a health care
institution is involved, written notice must also be given to the
FMCS and other appropriate state or territorial agencies sixty
days before termination or modification of the existing con-
tract. Section 8(d)(3) requires only a thirty-day notice where a
health care institution is not involved. Finally, section 8(d)(A)
requires that the existing contract continue in full force, pre-
serving the rights of both parties for ninety days after the initial
notice to the other party or until the date of expiration of the
existing contract, whichever occurs later. Where a health care
institution is not the employer, section 8(d)(4) requires only a
sixty-day extension of the contract where a health care institu-
59. Id. at 8; see also Id. at 4.
60. GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM, supra note 13, at § IV.
61. The amended procedural requirements of § 8(d) read:
(A) The notice of section 8(d)(1) shall be ninety days; the notice of section
8(d)(3) shall be sixty days; and the contract period of section 8(d)(4) shall be
ninety days.
(B) Where the bargaining is for an initial agreement following certification
or recognition, at least thirty days' notice of the existence of a dispute shall be
given by the labor organization to the agencies set forth in section 8(d)(3).
(C) After notice is given to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
under either clause (A) or (B) of this sentence, the Service shall promptly
communicate with the parties and use its best efforts, by mediation and concili-
ation, to bring them to agreement. The parties shall participate fully and
promptly in such meetings as may be undertaken by the Service for the purpose
of aiding in a settlement of the dispute.
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tion is not involved.
Section 8(d)(B) adds another notice provision dealing with
bargaining disputes about an initial agreement as opposed to
the termination or modification of an existing contract. The
new section requires a thirty-day written notice to the FMCS
and to any government arbitration agency of the existence of a
dispute concerning an initial agreement. This section empha-
sizes the concern which the legislators had for the initial im-
pact of these amendments on the health care industry.
It is as yet unsettled how the timing of the section 8(g)
notice relates to the section 8(d) notices. Section 8(g) specifi-
cally provides that "in the case of bargaining for an initial
agreement following certification or recognition the notice re-
quired by this subsection shall not be given until the expiration
of the period specified" in section 8(d)(B). However, the ab-
sence of similar language in provisions governing disputes over
the termination or modification of an existing contract implies
a different result in these situations. In a termination or modi-
fication case, the contract itself would determine when the
service of a section 8(g) notice is appropriate, since the contract
determines the duration of the present obligations of the par-
ties. Therefore, because the labor organization could engage in
a strike or picketing when the agreement expires, it could serve
the section 8(g) notice either ten days prior to the termination
of the contract or ten days prior to the ninety-day extension
provided for in section 8(d)(A). The labor organization need
not wait until the section 8(d) (A) notice period has run before
giving section 8(g) notice and can thus extend the initial
ninety-day period by an extra ten days."
Section 8(d)(C) applies to the health care industry alone
and requires mandatory mediation by the FMCS of disputes.
The new section specifies that the parties "shall participate
fully and promptly"6 3 with the FMCS in order to settle the
dispute. This amendment specifically reflects congressional
concern for maintaining health care services throughout dis-
putes in this industry, especially when read in light of section
204(a) (3),64 which also requires the participation of the FMCS
62. S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)(C).
64. Sec. 204(a)(3) of the Act reads:
(3) in case such dispute is not settled by conference, participate fully and
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in settling disputes. The General Counsel Memorandum indi-
cates that a refusal to participate with the FMCS might consti-
tute a refusal to bargain in violation of section 8(a) (5) or section
8(b)(3),15 regardless of the NLRB decision in Midas Interna-
tional Corp.,"6 where the NLRB held that refusal to participate
in mediation was not a per se refusal to bargain.
The amendments also contain a new section 213,17 authoriz-
ing the Director of the FMCS to establish an impartial board
of inquiry to investigate the unresolved issues in a dispute if he
promptly in such meetings as may be undertaken by the Service under this Act
for the purpose of aiding in a settlement of the dispute.
65. GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM, supra note 13, at 21-22.
66. 150 N.L.R.B. 486 (1964).
67. Sec. 213 reads:
(a) If, in the opinion of the Director of the Federal Mediation and Concilia-
tion Service a threatened or actual strike or lockout affecting a health care
institution will, if permitted to occur or to continue, substantially interrupt the
delivery of health care in the locality concerned, the Director may further assist
in the resolution of the impasse by establishing within 30 days after the notice
to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service under clause (A) of the last
sentence of section 8(d) (which is required by clause (3) of such section 8(d)),
or within 10 days after the notice under clause (B), an impartial Board of Inquiry
to investigate the issues involved in the dispute and to make a written report
thereon to the parties within fifteen (15) days after the establishment of such a
Board. The written report shall contain the findings of fact together with the
Board's recommendations for settling the dispute, with the objective of achiev-
ing a prompt, peaceful and just settlement of the dispute. Each such Board shall
be composed of such number of individuals as the Director may deem desirable.
No member appointed under this section shall have any interest or involvement
in the health care institutions or the employee organizations involved in the
dispute.
(b)(1) Members of any board established under this section who are other-
wise employed by the Federal Government shall serve without compensation
but shall be reimbursed for travel, subsistence, and other necessary expenses
incurred by them in carrying out its duties under this section.
(2) Members of any board established under this section who are not sub-
ject to paragraph (1) shall receive compensation at a rate prescribed by the
Director but not to exceed the daily rate prescribed for GS-18 of the General
Schedule under section 5332 of title 5, United States Code, including travel for
each day they are engaged in the performance of their duties under this section
and shall be entitled to reimbursement for travel, subsistence, and other neces-
sary expenses incurred by them in carrying out their duties under this section.
(c) After the establishment of a board under subsection (a) of this section
and for 15 days after any such board has issued its report, no change in the
status quo in effect prior to the expiration of the contract in the case of negotia-
tions for a contract renewal, or in effect prior to the time of the impasse in the
case of an initial bargaining negotiation, except by agreement, shall be made
by the parties to the controversy.
(d) There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary
to carry out the provisions of this section.
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feels that the dispute will "substantially interrupt" health care
services at the locality concerned. When the dispute is related
to the termination or modification of an existing contract, the
board must be established within thirty days after the initial
ninety-day notice required to be sent to the FMCS under sec-
tion 8(b)(A). If the dispute concerns bargaining for an initial
agreement, the board must be established within ten days after
the thirty-day notice required by section 8(d)(B). The report
and recommendations of the board of inquiry must be submit-
ted within fifteen days after the assignment was made. This
section must be read in conjunction with section 8(d), both
because the timing and procedure of section 213 depend upon
the notice provisions of sections 8(d) (A) and(B) and, more im-
portantly, because section 213 derives its significance to a great
extent from the mandatory mediation provision of section
8(d)(C).
Section 213(c) provides that for a period of fifteen days after
the board report has been submitted, "no change in the status
quo" shall be made by either party, except, of course, by agree-
ment. The "status quo" which must be preserved is defined as
that condition which existed prior to the expiration of the con-
tract in a contract renewal case, or prior to impasse in the case
of initial bargaining. This "status quo" provision will not have
any substantial effect on contract termination or modification
cases because it does not alter the ninety-day contract exten-
sion requirement found in section 8(d) (A). However, depending
on how early in the ninety-day section 8(d) notice period a
board of inquiry is established, the "status quo" provision of
section 213(c) could extend the thirty-day notice requirement
of section 8(d)(B) to forty days where employee or employer
activity would be proscribed. But, in fact, this extension would
not diminish their right to strike, since presumably the labor
organization could still give their section 8(g) notice at the end
of the initial thirty days and strike at the moment that the
forty days ran. The same result would have occurred without
the extension provided by section 213(c). The major restriction
imposed by section 213 is placed on the employer, not the
employees. An employer may not engage in any economic war-
fare during these additional ten days. For example, he is pro-
hibited from locking out his employees during the "status quo"
period. But if no board of inquiry had been established, no such
restriction on the employer's tactics is required by section 8(g).
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Because the amendments to section 8(d) and section 213
deal predominantly with procedures which enable the FMCS
to become involved in contract negotiation disputes before they
ripen into disruptive strikes or lockouts, it is difficult to gauge
the effect they have had on the health care industry. However,
initial reports indicate that the FMCS has had substantial
success in resolving labor disputes in health care facilities, and
it can only be presumed that at least part of this success can
be attributed to the new procedures outlined in the amend-
ments. In the first eleven months of the operation of the
amendments the FMCS recorded 1400 cases involving health
care facilities. Of these cases, only 37 resulted in work stop-
pages.68 Furthermore, by implementing the new powers con-
tained in section 213, the Director of the FMCS appointed a
board of inquiry in 54 cases, of which only four resulted in work
stoppages. 9 Future reports should provide an even clearer indi-
cation of the success of the new procedures because the FMCS
health care case load has increased dramatically since the en-
actment of the amendments.70
The major problems which still confront the FMCS in me-
diating health care industry disputes relate not to the proce-
dures adopted in the Act, but to secondary issues. For example,
health care management has not yet acquired bargainers with
sufficient experience to conduct negotiations smoothly.71 Sec-
ond, as the FMCS report notes, "third party rate regulators"
such as insurance companies and government sponsored care
programs play an important "behind the scenes" role in deter-
mining final wage and hour settlements." Because a nonprofit
health care institution depends upon independent sources for
financing, the FMCS must consult with insurance companies
and government agencies before settlement proposals can be
submitted to the disputing parties. In these circumstances, the
board of inquiry may be an important means of clarifying the
issues for more fruitful negotiations.
The FMCS has just begun to establish a formula for deter-
mining when it is appropriate to appoint a board of inquiry.
68. FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, 28TH ANNUAL REPORT (FISCAL
YEAR 1975), ch. IV, at 25.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 26.




Certainly, section 213 makes it clear that this decision is within
the discretion of the Director of the FMCS and must therefore
be made on a case-by-case basis. Nevertheless, despite the sta-
tistical success of the boards of inquiry used so far, they have
been appointed only in a few cases.3 The FMCS has based the
decision on several criteria, the most important of which is the
potential disruption to health care services in the locality con-
cerned:
Given the special services supplied by the hospitals in-
volved, the hardship and confusion that would result if a
walkout forced transfer of patients to other already crowded
hospitals in the area and considering that private physicians
would be called in from their own practices to assist in struck
hospitals, it was decided that a Board should be appointed.74
In another case, the FMCS refused to appoint a board because
large numbers of open hospital beds at other facilities reduced
the risk of serious disruption to community health services.75 It
appears that the Director of the FMCS first looks to the respec-
tive negotiating positions of the parties to determine whether
a settlement is likely. If not, he will consider such factors as
expenses, the possibility of delay in present negotiations, the
availability of board members able to aid in settling the partic-
ular dispute, whether the parties are ready to listen to the
board report, and finally and most importantly, the potential
for disruption of health care services within the community.
In summing up how the procedural changes to section 8(d)
and section 213 have worked to date, the FMCS has com-
mented: "The amendment has improved stability in health
care bargaining, established a uniform structure of bargaining
. . .for both proprietary and private nonprofit hospitals and
created safeguards for patient care in the event of a work stop-
page."76 If this is a true analysis, the legislative purpose of the
amendments has already been fulfilled.
VII. RELIGIOus EXEMPTION
Section 1911 provides that any employee of a health care
73. Id. at 25.
74. Id. at 28-29.
75. Id. at 29.
76. Id. at 27.
77. Sec. 19 reads:
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institution who is a member of a bona fide religion which has
traditionally held conscientious objections to labor organiza-
tions will not be required to "join or financially support any
labor organizations as a condition of employment." Congress
recognized the "special humanitarian character of health care
institutions""8 and felt that closed shops might create problems
concerning dues collections, particularly at facilities with close
religious affiliations. However, the amendment also applies to
persons who might attempt to use the exemption for the pur-
pose of receiving a "free ride."7 Accordingly, section 19 pro-
vides that employees exempt from supporting a labor organiza-
tion may be required to pay sums of money equal to initiation
and dues fees to a tax exempt nonreligious charitable fund in
lieu of making payments to the labor organization.
The NLRB has viewed section 19 as only a limited excep-
tion to union security obligations. The burden of proving mem-
bership in a bona fide religion which has traditionally objected
to labor organizations is placed on the individual. The legisla-
tive history supports this narrow construction of the section 19
exemption. It illustrates Congress' desire that section 19 should
not become a loophole for individuals seeking to avoid dues
payments. 80 In an early case decided by the General Counsel's
Office, a woman claimed the section 19 exemption, based on
her private religious beliefs .8 Her claim was based on her idio-
syncratic interpretation of the tenets of Roman Catholicism,
her religion. However, she did not show that Roman Catholi-
cism historically objected to labor organizations. The General
Any employee of a health care institution who is a member of and adheres
to established and traditional tenets or teachings of a bona fide religion, body,
or sect which has historically held conscientious objections to joining or finan-
cially supporting labor organizations shall not be required to join or financially
support any labor organization as a condition of employment; except that such
employee may be required, in lieu of periodic dues and initiation fees, to pay
sums equal to such dues and initiation fees to a nonreligious charitable fund
exempt from taxation under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,
chosen by such employee from a list of at least three such funds, designated in
a contract between such institution and a labor organization, or if the contract
fails to designate such funds, then to any such fund chosen by the employee.
78. S. REP. No. 93-766, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1974).
79. For comments made during congressional debate see 120 CONG. REC. 22574
(1974); 120 CONG. REC. 16902-03 (1974); 120 CONG. REC. 13539-40 (1974).
80. 120 CONG. Rc. 22574 (1974); 120 CONG. REC. 16902-03; 120 CONG. REc. 13539-
40 (1974).
81. N.L.R.B. GENERAL COUNSEL'S MONTHLY REPORT ON HEALTH CARE INSTITUTION
CAsEs § III, at 10.
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Counsel's Office rejected the woman's claim on the ground that
a restrictive construction of section 19 was intended by Con-
gress.12 Thus, it appears that the Board will take a narrow
approach to section 19 claims by remaining sensitive to an
employee's well-founded religious convictions, without losing
sight of potential "free rider" problems.
In some situations, the section 19 exemption question is
overshadowed by other issues. For example, where members of
a religious order are employed at a health care institution
owned and operated by their order, the applicability of the
section 19 exemption may never be reached because the mem-
bers of the order may be excluded from the labor organization
as inappropriate for any bargaining unit.
VIII. RECOGNITIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL PICKETING
Section 8(b) (7) (C) 3 provides that a labor organization may
picket the premises of an employer for a "reasonable period of
time not to exceed 30 days" where the purpose of the picketing
is recognitional or organizational. However, Congress was
aware of the disruptive impact such activity may have on
health care institutions and indicated that section 8(b)(7)
rights may be altered where a union is seeking to organize a
82. Id. at 11.
83. Sec. 8(b)(7)(C) reads:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be
picketed, any employer where an object thereof is forcing or requiring an em-
ployer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of
his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept
or select such labor organization as their collective bargaining representative,
unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative of such
employees:
(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under
section 9(c) being filed within a reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty
days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided, That when such a
petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the provi-
sions of section 9(c)(1) or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest on
the part of the labor organization, direct an election in such unit as the Board
finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results thereof: Provided further,
That nothing in this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picket-
ing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully advising the public (including
consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract
with, a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any
individual employed by any other person in the course of his employment, not
to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services.
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health care facility. In cases of organizational picketing at a
health care institution, a period of time less than thirty days
is reasonable, although such activity need not be banned com-
pletely. 4 This result is similar to other cases where special
circumstances such as violence have led the NLRB to shorten
the "reasonable time" element of section 8(b)(7)(C) to less
than thirty days."'
The General Counsel's Office suggests the following guide-
lines for determining a reasonable time:
In evaluating the "reasonable time" period, relevant fac-
tors would include the nature of the illnesses being treated at
the picketed institution and the effects of the picketing on the
institution's ability to treat its patients. Where the picketing
causes serious effects upon the institution's ability to treat
seriously ill patients, a relatively shorter period of time




Thus, the NLRB will not automatically reduce the thirty-day
period in all cases involving health care institutions, but it will
be receptive to a reduction once it is shown that patient care
has been affected. If Congress had intended a per se reduction
of the "reasonable time" requirement for organizational picket-
ing found in section 8(b)(7)(C), it could have specified a time
period in the new amendments. However, since no such change
was made, the NLRB is correct in its position that the right to
picket granted under the Act must be preserved to the greatest
extent possible.
IX. SOLICITATION AND DISTRIBUTION RULES OF HEALTH CARE
INSTITUTIONS
As a general rule, broad no-solicitation rules which are not
limited to working hours or to working areas of the employer's
premises are presumptively invalid. However, where the em-
ployer can show that the union solicitation would interfere with
production, plant discipline, or plant cleanliness, 7 this pre-
sumption is overcome. The amendments raise the question of
84. 12.0 CONG. REc. 12935, 12944 (1974); 120 CONG. REc. 22576 (1974).
85. See, e.g., Local 346, International Leather Goods Union v. Compton, 292 F.2d
313 (1st Cir. 1961); UMW District 12, 177 N.L.R.B. 213 (1969).
86. GENERAL COUNSEL MEMORANDUM supra note 13, at 29.
87. See, e.g., Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945); United Steel-




whether the nature of health care institutions of itself is a spe-
cial circumstance justifying a broad no-solicitation/no-
distribution rule at patient care facilities.
NLRB cases dealing with nursing homes decided prior to
the enactment of the health care amendments show a concern
for preventing disruption of patient care. These cases support
the view that no-solicitation rules in health care facilities
should be broader than rules in non-health care related facili-
ties, simply because of the special nature of the work per-
formed.88 However, these cases limited the prohibitions against
solicitation to areas of the facility actually used for patient
care. Thus, in the case of Cedar Corp.9 the NLRB held that a
rule prohibiting distribution on a public sidewalk in front of the
facility's premises was overly broad because the employer
failed to show that such activity would interfere with patient
care.
The NLRB continues to apply these pre-amendment stan-
dards to all nonprofit health care institutions now covered by
the Act. Thus, in the case of St. John's Hospital," the NLRB
indicated that no-solicitation/no-distribution rules may extend
to areas where immediate patient care is taking place, but that
rules prohibiting solicitation and distribution in all areas which
are merely accessible to patients and visitors is overly broad.
In effect, the Board has extended the special circumstances
exception to areas of direct patient care, but has retained the
presumption of invalidity when applied to areas not exclusively
devoted to patient care.
X. BARGAINING UNITS
During the first few years since the enactment of the
amendments, while the health care industry was first being
organized under the rules of the Act, the most frequently liti-
gated issue was the scope of the bargaining unit. As a result, a
well-developed standard for defining the appropriate bargain-
ing unit now exists.
The Committee Reports reflect a strong intent to avoid a
proliferation of bargaining units within a single health care
88. See NLRB v. Summit Nursing Convalescent Home, 472 F.2d 1380 (6th Cir.
1973); for an excellent discussion of the case see Feheley, Amendments to the National
Labor Relations Act: Health Care Institutions, 36 Omo ST. L.J. 235, 293-94 (1975).
89. Cedar Corp., 203 N.L.R.B. 100 (1973).
90. 222 N.L.R.B. No. 182, 91 LRRM 1333 (Feb. 27, 1976).
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facility.' These Reports express the fear that a multitude of
separate units might create instability in patient care because
the employer would be subjected to potential labor disputes
from many different fronts at almost any time. However, the
NLRB has not demanded large units as an ironclad rule. In-
stead, the NLRB has attempted to deal realistically with the
great variety of job classifications within the health care indus-
try.
When making a unit determination in a health care institu-
tion, the NLRB relies on the traditional criteria for defining a
unit with but one additional criterion specific to this industry.
The criteria used are (a) mutuality of interest in wages, bene-
fits and working conditions, (b) commonality of skills and su-
pervision, (c) frequency of contact with other employees, (d)
interchange and functional integration, (e) area practice and
patterns of bargaining, and (f) congressional intent to avoid a
proliferation of bargaining units within the health care indus-
try.2 By employing these criteria, the NLRB has expanded the
administrative construction of the concept "community of in-
terest" and has thereby restricted the number of labeled units
appropriate for the health care industry in general.
The NLRB has determined that a separate clerical unit is
appropriate.13 The interests of the employees in this group can
be distinguished from those of other employees because they
perform only administrative functions. All of their work is done
within administrative offices and separated from the areas des-
ignated for patient care. Clerical employees never come in con-
tact with patients during the ordinary course of their job. Ex-
amples of job classifications included in this unit are secretar-
ies and office clerks. The NLRB, however, has excluded mail
clerks, messengers and administrative clerks from the clerical
unit, even though the majority of their time is spent in the
administrative offices and their duties include only minimal
91. 120 CONG. Rac. 12935 (1974); 120 CONG. REc. 22574 (1974). The legislative
history goes on to say that only four units would be appropriate within a health care
institution, indicating that the Board should keep it at that level. The four units listed
were (a) professional, (b) technical, (c) clerical and (d) service and maintenance. 120
CONG. Rac. 12943 (1974).
92. See Riverside Methodist Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 92 LRRM 1033 (Apr.
28, 1976); Jewish Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 91 LRRM 1499 (Apr. 2, 1976).




patient contact. 4 Apparently the critical element in determin-
ing what employees should be included in this unit is patient
contact. An employee whose normal duties include the slight-
est direct patient contact will be excluded from this unit.
The service and maintenance unit is distinguished from
other units because these employees perform their duties in
areas where patient care takes place. These employees need not
actually care for patients, but rather maintain the physical
operation of the facility, perform administrative duties within
the patient care areas and render direct patient care not requir-
ing the technical or professional skills. This unit is by far the
broadest interest group and includes a wide variety of job clas-
sifications.
Based upon the factors which traditionally determine ap-
propriate bargaining units, hospital engineers are included in
the service and maintenance unit. In the case of Methodist
Hospital95 the NLRB found that even plant maintenance em-
ployees who are trained in specialized areas of maintenance
work, such as electricians, plumbers and.painters, and who use
sophisticated tools of their trade, do not have a community of
interest sufficiently distinct from other service and mainte-
nance employees to constitute a separate bargaining unit. In
the Riverside case, the NLRB, citing the congressional, intent
of avoiding a proliferation of bargaining units, emphasized fac-
tors such as employee contact, common facilities, and related
benefits and working conditions to substantiate a similar hold-
ing.9 6
Other employees found to be appropriate for the service and
maintenance unit include mail clerks, messengers and pur-
chasing department clerks. 7 Although these employees per-
form primarily an administrative function, their participation
in patient care operations establishes a community of interest
with the service and maintenance employees sufficient to in-
clude them in this general unit.
The NLRB has also included in this unit such job classifica-
tions as electrocardiogram technicians, electroencephlograph
94. Jewish Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 91 LRRM 1499 (Apr. 2, 1976).
95. 223 N.L.R.B. No. 158, 92 LRRM 1033 (Apr. 28, 1976).
96. See also Baptist Memorial Hosp., 224 N.L.R.B. No. 51, 92 LRRM 1223 (May
27, 1976).
97. Jewish Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 91 LRRM 1499 (Apr. 2, 1976).
19771
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
technicians and intravenous infusion technicians. To perform
their job functions, these employees do not need a high degree
of education.
A minimum of special training, and no certification, regis-
tration or licensing is all that is required.98 These factors clearly
distinguish these and similar job classifications from the more
highly skilled technical and professional positions. Consistent
with the legislative aim to limit the number of bargaining
units, the NLRB has held that these employees do not possess
a community of interest sufficiently distinct from the service
and maintenance employees to justify placing them in a sepa-
rate unit.
The technical unit is the third separate unit which the
NLRB has found appropriate in the health care industry. In
order to perform jobs in this classification, the employees must
have specialized skill acquired through a high degree off formal
education. However, neither special certification nor a great
deal of independent judgment is required in the performance
of these ordinary duties. Laboratory technicians99 are examples
of employees within the technical unit. Their job qualifications
require a degree in biochemistry or chemistry. Operating room
technicians who must have both a degree and certification are
also members of the technical unit.
Licensed practical nurses (LPN's) are included in this unit
as a general rule. LPN qualifications include both formal edu-
cation and licensing, but their interests are more closely
aligned to those of the technical unit than the professional unit.
In certain situations, however, the NLRB has placed LPN's in
a professional unit where they performed jobs requiring a
greater skill than is required for an LPN performing ordinary
duties. Thus, in Children's Hospital' the NLRB held that
LPN's whose jobs involved the treatment of children were pro-
fessional employees and therefore were excluded from the tech-
nical unit. The NLRB cited the specialized training required
for this work as well as the higher skill necessary to qualify for
the job as showing a greater community of interest with the
professional employees than with the technicals.
98. See St. Luke's Episcopal Hosp., 222 N.L.R.B. No. 109, 91 LRRM 1359 (Jan.
30, 1976); Methodist Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 92 LRRM 1198 (May 21, 1976);
Jewish Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. No. 91, 91 LRRM 1499 (Apr. 2, 1976).
99. Methodist Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. No. 186, 92 LRRM 1198 (May 21, 1976).
100. 222 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 91 LRRM 1440 (Jan. 22, 1976).
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The final identifiable unit which the NLRB has defined as
appropriate for bargaining purposes is the professional unit.
The NLRB's definition of a "professional" depends on job
qualifications rather than job description. As a result, a
broader community of interest is established among employees
performing a great variety of medical functions requiring a high
degree of skill throughout the health care institution. The pro-
fessional unit is comprised of employees who are highly skilled
and certified. In addition, they exercise a high degree of inde-
pendent judgment in the performance of their duties."°' Medi-
cal technologist and registered pharmacists12 are examples of
job classifications which are part of a professional unit. How-
ever, the NLRB has found it appropriate to relax these stan-
dards where, as for example, laboratory employees who met the
degree requirements for medical technologist were in fact per-
forming work done by medical technologists, but had not yet
been certified. 03
The NLRB has classified registered nurses as professional
employees. Therefore, as a general rule, registered nurses have
been placed in the professional unit for bargaining purposes.' 4
However, there have been exceptions to this rule. The NLRB
has found a unit consisting solely of registered nurses appropri-
ate for bargaining purposes when the traditional indicia justify
such a classification. In Morristown-Ham blen Hospital
Association"°5 the petitioning union sought a unit of all full-
time registered nurses to the exclusion of other professional
employees including emergency room physicians and a regis-
tered pharmacist. The NLRB found such a separate unit ap-
propriate:
Here, the RN's are all employed in a single department
and subject to the single overall supervision of the director of
nursing services. The emergency room physicians report di-
rectly to the Hospital administrator or the board of directors
101. See § 2(12) of the Act.
102. See Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, 225 N.L.R.B. No. 50, 92 LRRM 1412
(June 30, 1976); Children's Hosp., 222 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 91 LRRM 1440 (Jan. 22, 1976);
Morristown-Hamblen Hosp. Ass'n, 226 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 93 LRRM 1166 (Sept. 22,
1976).
103. Children's Hosp., 222 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 91 LRRM 1440 (Jan. 22, 1976).
104. See, e.g., Family Doctor Medical Group, 226 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 93 LRRM 1193
(Sept. 23, 1976); Valley Hosp., 221 N.L.R.B. No. 210, 91 LRRM 1061 (Dec. 23, 1975)
[supplementing 200 N.L.R.B. No. 216, 90 LRRM 1411].
105. 226 N.L.R.B. No. 13, 93 LRRM 1166 (Sept. 22, 1976).
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and the pharmacist reports to the director of supply. The
nurses have formal meetings among themselves, and there is
no evidence that the doctors or the pharmacist attend these
meetings. The nurses' educational prerequisites, duties and
responsibilities, and pay scales differ substantially from
those of the emergency room physicians and the pharma-
cist. ,06
This statement emphasizes the NLRB's basic position of not
hesitating to increasee the number of bargaining units within
a health care facility regardless of congressional intent where
the petitioning labor organization can establish a sufficiently
distinct community of interest within a group of employees.
Ultimately, the NLRB must still rely on its own experience in
the field of labor relations when making the final decision con-
cerning appropriate units.
Normally, where a union is seeking to represent a mixed
professional and nonprofessional unit, the Board orders a self-
determination election pursuant to section 9(b)(1).107 Thus, in
Family Doctor Medical Group"°" the NLRB ordered a
Sonotone-type election.10 1 Thus, the NLRB ordered a self-
determination election for all professional employees, includ-
ing registered nurses, laboratory technologists and a dietician,
and then specified the appropriate bargaining units based on
the results of the secondary professional vote. However, the
NLRB has not granted a self-determination vote in every case.
Where it believes that a separate professional unit would not
be appropriate, it will include the professional employees in the
technical unit and refuse to allow a self-determination vote.110
106. Id. at -. , 93 LRRM at 1168.
107. Sec. 9(b)(1) of the Act reads:
The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees
the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act, the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit,
craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided, That the Board shall not
(1) decide that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if such unit includes
both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees
unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit.
108. 226 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 93 LRRM 1193 (Sept. 23, 1976).
109. Sonotone Corp., 90 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1950).
110. Children's Hosp., 222 N.L.R.B. No. 90, 91 LRRM 1440 (Jan. 22, 1976). In this
case, the Board did not grant a self-determination election because the only profes-
sional employees involved were a very few medical technologists. In denying the sec-
ondary vote, the Board felt that if the professionals voted to form a separate group it
would be inappropriate for voting purposes.
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The NLRB has also declared that certain employees are
beyond the scope of appropriate bargaining units and has de-
nied them a vote in representation elections because they are
either (a) employees whose interest in employment is not suffi-
cient to place them in any bargaining unit, or (b) employees
whose interests are too closely aligned with management to be
included in a bargaining unit. Students working at a hospital
only part-time and receiving wages lower than any other em-
ployee group are an example of an uninterested group excluded
from representation by the NLRB."' These employees gener-
ally work only after school for a single school year and thus do
not share a community of interest with any other employees
sufficient enough to place them in one of the labeled units.
Certainly they do not constitute an appropriate unit standing
alone.
The exclusion of employees whose interests are closely asso-
ciated with management is illustrated by the case of St. An-
thony Center, "2 where the health care facility was closely affili-
ated with the Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word religious
order. Several employees having job classifications falling
within the unit sought by the petitioning union were also mem-
bers of this religious order. Facing the issue of whether to ex-
clude these employees from the bargaining unit, the NLRB
cited the allegiance which the disputed employees owed to the
employer and then went on to state:
In sum, we are satisfied that the members of the religious
order here at issue should not be included in the unit sought
to be represented by the Petitioner. In so doing, we rely par-
ticularly on the fact that their economic interests do not coin-
cide with those of the lay employees; on their different terms
and conditions of employment; and on the conflicts of loyalty
that could result from their simultaneous membership in the
bargaining unit and in the same religious order that owns and
operates Saint Anthony Center. Accordingly, we shall ex-
clude sisters of the Order from the unit.13
111. Seq Pawating Hosp. Ass'n, 222 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 91 LRRM 1230 (Jan. 30,
1976) (high school students); Clark County Mental Health Center, 225 N.L.R.B. No.
105, 92 LRRM 1545 (July 29, 1976) (psychology interns).
112. 220 N.L.R.B. No. 139, 90 LRRM 1405 (Oct. 1, 1975).
113. Id. at -, 90 LRRM at 1409; for a further discussion of this issue see St. Rose
de Lima Hosp., 223 N.L.R.B. No. 224, 92 LRRM 1181 (May 21, 1976).
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Where a religious organization operates a health care facility
in which all employees having a special contractual relation-
ship with the employer by virtue of membership in the religious
organization which operates the facility, these employees will
be excluded from union representation by the NLRB. Under
these circumstances, the section 19 religius exemption would
never apply since the religiously affiliated employees would be
excluded from union activity in the first instance.
The status of interns and residents has created the most
interesting dilemma for the NLRB. In a series of recent deci-
sions, the NLRB has attempted to define their status, but has
succeeded only in creating more confusion. In the case of
Cedars-Sinai Medical Center"' the NLRB held that interns
and residents were not "employees" under the Act and thus
were not subject to the duties and obligations placed on em-
ployees under federal law. Subsequently, in the case of Kansas
City General Hospital and Medical Center, Inc.," 5 the NLRB
ruled that health care institutions were not "employers" under
the Act for the purpose of disputes involving interns or resi-
dents. This decision indicates that state legislation could con-
trol the labor relations between employers and interns and resi-
dents. However, the NLRB recently revised its decision in
Kansas City General Hospital and Medical Center, Inc."6 and
held that federal law does preempt state laws in this area of
labor relations and therefore presumably that in disputes in-
volving health care institutions and residents or interns neither
party is subject to any federal or state restraints. The danger
to the public interest of this is pointed out by Member Fanning
in his dissenting opinon: "Such disputes will be resolved solely
in accordance with the militancy and economic resources of the
contending parties, free of any restraining or mediatory influ-
ences of Federal or state law." '1" 7 Certainly a more definite
statement on the law concerning the status of residents and
interns must be made by the NLRB or, if necessary, by the
legislature, so that this legal issue does not become even more
confused and before the stability sought by the Act is lost.
114. 223 N.L.R.B. No. 57, 91 LRRM 1398 (March 19, 1976). In Cedars-Sinai, the
Board held that interns and residents were to be considered students, and therefore
they were exempt under the Act.
115. 225 N.L.R.B. No. 14, 92 LRRM 1379 (June 24, 1976).





The health care amendments have had a dramatic impact
on management-labor relations in the health care industry.
Predictably, early cases faced by the NLRB have dealt largely
with union organizing, but other broader issues have also been
considered, and the NLRB has had some opportunity to refine
the language of the new legislation. The NLRB has stabilized
labor relations in the industry by applying the specific provi-
sions of the amendments with a constant reference to the dual
purposes of the legislation to protect labor and to maintain
patient care. It has tried to strike a balance between the often
competing interests of the employee, the employer and the
public. As these competing interests become more acquainted
with their respective duties and obligations under the new law,
the issues will crystallize and the NLRB determinations will be
more refined. Hopefully, as the courts decide appeals of NLRB
decisions, the law will become even more clearly defined. At
least thus far it can be concluded that the amendments have
provided some resolutions to some of the most complex prob-
lems in labor law.
JOHN M. MILLER
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